



## **Impact on maritime security of the conflict between Israel and Iran**

Recent attacks between Israel and Iran have significantly heightened tensions in the area, raising concerns for the safety of merchant vessels in and around the Arabian/Persian Gulf and Israeli waters.

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The situation is evolving rapidly, and there is a growing risk of spillover effects impacting shipping. With permission from [Vanguard](#), we reproduce below their comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation measures for our clients.

## Persian Gulf

- As of  
**18 June**

, Israeli attacks on Iran remain ongoing, with strikes reported on, including but not limited to, targets in Esfahan, Markazi, Alborz, Tehran, and Khorasan Razavi provinces. In Esfahan, strikes the Artesh Airbase, Najafabad, the Shahid Kharrazi Barracks, and a drone production facility near Shahin Shahr. In Markazi, strikes targeted the Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defence site near the Fordow nuclear facility. In Alborz, the Shahid Meisami Group facility in Karaj was targeted. Strikes were also reported on a military airbase in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.

- Iran launched five separate waves of ballistic missile barrages against Israel on 17 June. The first wave involved around 20 missiles and struck a parking lot and the Military Intelligence School at Camp Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv. The second wave included 10 ballistic missiles targeting central Israel. The third wave included two missiles, with one intercepted and the other landing in an open area. The fourth and fifth waves targeted southern and northern Israel, with three and two missiles launched respectively.

- Former Iranian Economy Minister Ehsan Khandoozi said on 17 June that passage through the Strait of Hormuz should be subject to Iran's approval. He was quoted by state media as saying, "Starting tomorrow, for 100 days, no oil tanker or LNG shipment should be allowed through the Strait without Iran's confirmation." He added, "Any delay means enduring more war on our soil. Trump's war must be ended through a combination of economy and security." However, there has been no official confirmation from Iranian authorities or government ministries indicating that any such directive is being implemented. Moreover, Khandoozi currently holds no government position or policymaking authority, and his remarks appear to reflect an escalation in rhetoric rather than the announcement of an actionable policy.

- **As of 18 June 2025,**  
no large-scale hostilities have been reported in the Persian Gulf and no specific threats have been communicated toward maritime vessels and traffic in the region. Military activity in the Persian Gulf has been restricted to GPS / GNSS interference and military drills carried out by the IRGC Navy. Nevertheless, the situation is highly fluid as Israel has committed to a lengthy campaign against Iran to reassure that the country will not achieve a nuclear weapon, and Iran will almost certainly explore new options to target Israeli and US assets. .

- Therefore,  
**as of 18 June**  
, Vanguard assesses:

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LOW An incident is unlikely		MODERATE An incident is possible	SUBSTANTIAL An incident is credible	HIGH An incident is likely	EXTREME An incident is highly likely
EXTREME		There is an <b>EXTREME</b> risk of an IRGCN detention/seizure/UAV attack against any merchant vessels with clear/obvious links/affiliations to Israel. This risk extends to Israeli-flagged vessels, and vessels fully or partially owned by Israeli businesses/entities.			
EXTREME		There is an <b>EXTREME</b> risk to all vessels transiting the region of experiencing the effects of military activity, air defence operations, and possible GNSS interference.			
HIGH		There is a <b>HIGH</b> risk of IRGCN action against US military and naval assets in the region. The risk of collateral extends to vessels in the immediate vicinity of such assets.			
SUBSTANTIAL	MODERATE	There is a <b>SUBSTANTIAL</b> risk of IRGCN approaches/harassment and a <b>MODERATE</b> risk of boardings against all vessels. However, such action is highly unlikely to materialise into subsequent seizure or detention for vessels with no links/affiliation to Israel, and for vessels not obviously linked to ongoing US-Iranian tit-for-tat.			
MODERATE		There is a <b>MODERATE</b> risk of Iranian military action or restrictions attempting to the compromise freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf to assert control and pressure on Israeli or US international partners in the area. Nevertheless, a total restriction in the Straits of Hormuz remains highly unlikely as Iran will not wish to fully alienate regional Gulf states or draw a US military response.			

## Israel / Gaza / West Bank

Following the initiation of the conflict with Iran on 13 June, Israel has put the West Bank under lockdown. Several checkpoints have been set up across the enclave as the presence of soldiers has increased in el-Bireh and Ramallah. Confirmed checkpoints have been established in Marda, Nablus, Hebron, Qalqilya and the Jordan Valley.

The Houthis have reportedly launched ballistic missiles at Israel in a purported coordinated strike with Iran. The missiles were reportedly intercepted. The armed group has confirmed it is supporting Iran in its current conflict with Israel. This follows reports of a failed Israeli assassination attempt of the Houthi Chief of Staff, Mohammed Al-Ghamari, on 14 June 2025.

## Electronic interference

As highlighted by Vanguard above, UKMTO in their [advisory](#) #23, and in reports by various organizations, there have been numerous reports of electronic interference in and around the Persian Gulf region. According to Intertanko, there have also been reports of fake Automatic Identification System (AIS) echoes in the region. These false signals, particularly when appearing near your vessel's course, could be used by attackers to induce undesirable navigational actions.

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Navigators should therefore be prepared to navigate using terrestrial and dead-reckoning methods. This alternative navigation may be necessary for extended periods until satellite signals are restored. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) itself is also likely to be affected by jamming or spoofing attacks. Any AIS data, especially regarding the positions of other vessels, should be used with extreme caution.

For detailed guidance on detecting and mitigating GPS disruption, reference can be made to Intertanko's [Jamming and Spoofing of GNSS](#) publication. Additionally, Gard has published a case study on a grounding incident caused by GPS disruption, [which can be found here](#).

Vanguard recommends the following **mitigation measures** :

- Strict adherence to counter-piracy BMP Maritime Security (MS).
- Affiliation checks as part of the pre-transit Voyage Risk Assessment (VRA).
- Heightened vigilance – AIS, visual and radar adjusted for small craft.
- Registration & maintaining communication with MSCIO and UKMTO to stay informed about potential threats and updates.
- In the event of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/projectile sighting, please ensure crew are briefed and gather in the appropriate Safe Muster Point (SMP); the SMP should be within the superstructure, and above the waterline.
- Be prepared for potential GPS malfunctions. Exercise increased caution during navigation by maintaining enhanced visual lookouts and relying more heavily on radar-based navigation.
- Maintain awareness of any vessels that are not transmitting their AIS – should the crew sight any such cases, please maintain a safe distance from such crafts.

Should the crew sight anything suspicious or unusual, please report to CSO, UKMTO watchkeepers

## Contractual implications

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran can lead to charterparty issues, such as if the Master decides to deviate for the safety of the vessel and crew. As to who bears the costs depends heavily on the terms of the specific charterparty, particularly the routing and war risk clauses (for example BIMCO's CONWARTIME 2013/2025 and VOYWAR 2013/2025).

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These clauses generally protect shipowners if the vessel "may be exposed" to war risks, potentially allowing deviation from the agreed or customary route, for the safety of the vessel, her crew and her cargo in the Master's reasonable assessment. However, the application of these clauses and the financial responsibility for deviation costs hinge on factors such as whether the risks have materially changed since the charterparty's inception, if a specific route was contractually agreed upon, and the specific wording of any war risk clauses. Whether these clauses could be said to be triggered would have to be assessed on a case by case basis.

For a more detailed discussion on contractual and insurance implications, please refer to Gard article [Red Sea war risks and insurance implications](#) .

## External references

- [Joint Maritime Information Centre](#) advisories.
- [UKMTO](#)
- [Industry transit advice for Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman](#)
- [Maritime Global Security](#)
- [Best Management Practices Maritime Security](#)  
(replaces BMP 5)

*We would like to thank [Vanguard-Tech](#) for helping us with this alert.*

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